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UTAH COURT .»!?' i WK M-M 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MAX L, SMITH, 
D e f e n d a n t A p p e 1 J d 11L 
Case No. 950715-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT QF AE PEALS 
This Court has appellate iu!isdiction in this matter 
p u r s u a n t L o u i e : " '* Code A i 11 io t a t e d S e c t i 01 ) 
7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) f ) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
] W h e t h e r t h e t r i a 1 c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n 
r e f u s i n g t o accept t h e s t i p u 1 a t i o i I o f 1: h e p a r t i e s w h i c 1: I w o u 1 d 
bifurcate the issue of Smith's three pri or convictions for 
Driv:i i Ig I Ji ider 11 Ie 11 if J i Ience? See St.a. te \i J ai i: tes , / ' 6 i I 2d 54 9, 
557 (Utah 1989) (relying on State v. Saunders,, 699 P. 2d 739 (Utah 
] 98 5) ) . 
This issue was preserved i n a motion by the parties made 
immediate! y prior to the trial's commencement (R. 147-150). 
1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(7) (a) (1994 Supp.) 
A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of the prior violations 
under this section is a third degree felony if at least 
three prior convictions are for violations committed 
after April 23, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Max L. Smith appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
commitment imposed by the Honorable Guy R. Burningham on 
September 27, 1995, after a jury trial at which Smith was 
convicted of Driving under the Influence, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Smith was charged by information filed on or about January 
18, 1995, with Driving Under the Influence, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44 (1995 
Supp.) (R. 9)1. A preliminary hearing was conducted on January 
26, 1995 (R. 7-8), after which Smith was bound-over to the Fourth 
District Court where they entered a plea of "not guilty" at 
arraignment (R. 11, 16). 
'Smith was also charged with Driving on Revocation, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-2-136. 
Smith, however, does not challenge that conviction on appeal. 
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On May 22, 1995, a jury trial was held in Fourth District 
Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham presiding, wherein Smith 
convicted (R. 145-355) . Smith moved the trial court for an 
Arrest of Judgment on May 31, 1995 (R. 101-106); and that motion 
was denied by Order signed on July 17, 1995 (R. 124) On 
September 27, 1995, Judge Burningham sentenced Smith to three-
years probation (R. 132-134, 356-368) and this appeal followed 
(R. 139). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 22, 1995, a jury trial was conducted in Fourth 
District Court, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham presiding, at 
which Smith was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, a third 
degree felony (R. 145-355) . 
Prior to the beginning of trial, the parties gave notice to 
the trial court of their intent to enter a stipulation on the 
record which would bifurcate the proceedings and preclude the 
introduction of evidence of Smith's three/four prior DUI 
convictions until after the jury's deliberation on the charged 
offense in order to avoid the introduction of evidence which is 
more prejudicial than probative (R. 147). Then, if Smith was 
convicted by the jury of the charged offense minus the element of 
three prior convictions, Smith would waive the jury relative to 
the "prior convictions" element of the offense and the State 
3 
would present evidence of the prior convictions to the trial 
court (R. 147-48).2 
The trial court refused to accept the stipulation stating 
that "I tried that once in another county and found that it was 
quite burdensome and confusing to the jury" (R. 148). The trial 
court added thatf because the prior convictions constitute a 
necessary element of the charged offense, "I'm going to require 
that it be done according to the statute, rather than try to 
bifurcate it" (R. 148-49). 
During trial, the jury was informed of Smith's prior 
convictions (R. 168-69, 258, 327) and was instructed prior to 
deliberation that the prior convictions were an essential element 
of the charged offense (R.84, 85 (Instruction Nos. 2 and 3)). In 
addition, the verdict form given to the jury required a finding 
of either "Guilty" or "Not Guilty" (R. 88). Smith was 
subsequently convicted by the jury (R. 88, 352-54). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Smith asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to accept the parties' stipulation to bifurcated 
2In fact, the State advocated for a bifurcated procedure in its 
proposed jury instructions and verdict form (R. 25-56). For 
example, in the instruction setting forth the charge as contained 
in the criminal information and in the instruction breaking-down 
the essential elements of the offense, all references to prior 
convictions were removed (R. 53, 54). Likewise, in the State's 
proposed verdict form, the jury would be instructed to find either 
"The facts alleged have been proven" or "The facts alleged have not 
been proven" (R. 25) (emphasis in original) . 
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proceedings. Utah courts have repeatedly found that in cases 
where prior convictions are an element of the charged offense, 
proceedings should be bifurcated, absent contrary legislative 
guidance, unless such convictions are competent to establish 
defendant's culpability for the offense for which he is then on 
trial. Moreover, a trial court's failure to bifurcate in such a 
case is reversible error for which prejudice is generally 
presumed. In this case, evidence of Smith's prior-DUI 
convictions could not establish that Smith was driving under the 
influence of alcohol at the time of the alleged offense. 
Therefore, it was prejudicial error constituting an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to refuse to bifurcate the 
proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO BIFURCATE THE PROCEEDINGS AS REQUESTED BY BOTH 
COUNSEL FOR THE STATE AND COUNSEL FOR SMITH 
Immediately prior to the commencement of Smith's trial, the 
trial court was presented with a proposed stipulation by the 
parties which would bifurcate the proceedings and prohibit the 
introduction of evidence of Smith's prior DUI convictions until 
the jury had convicted Smith of the other elements of the current 
DUI charge (R. 147-48) . The purpose of the stipulation was to 
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avoid the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence to the jury 
prior to their examination of the elements relating solely to the 
incident which formed the basis of the current charge (R. 147). 
The trial court refused the request to bifurcate the 
proceedings because it would be "quite burdensome and confusing 
to the jury" (R. 148); and because the prior convictions 
constituted a necessary element of the charged felony-DUI 
offense. 
During trial, the jury was informed of Smith's prior 
convictions (R. 168-69, 258, 327) and Smith was subsequently 
found "guilty" of the charged offense (R. 88, 352-54). 
Smith asserts that the trial court abused its discretion, 
and committed reversible error, in its refusal to bifurcate the 
evidence of Smith's prior-DUI convictions from evidence related 
exclusively to the commission of the charged DUI. 
In State v. Stewart, 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined a bifurcated procedure to be followed by 
trial courts in DUI cases which involve prior-DUI convictions and 
purport to impose a greater punishment for a subsequent DUI 
offense. The purpose of this procedure, in the absence of 
legislative direction, was to "properly expedite the adjudication 
of such cases, while at the same time safeguard[ing] the 
substantial rights of accused persons and to prevent an accused 
person from being advertised to the jury as one who previously 
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perpetrated a similar type of offense.'' Stewart, 171 P.2d at 386. 
This procedure was instigated by the Court "in view of the 
prejudicial nature of the evidence of prior conviction as such 
evidence bears on proof of commission of the substantive 
offense." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court then adopted the bifurcated procedure 
utilized by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Ferrone, 
113 A. 452, a habitual criminal case: In the absence of statutory 
regulation, the information should be divided into two parts. 
The first detailing the elements of the current offense; and the 
second, alleging the existence of prior convictions. Stewart, 
111 P.2d at 387 (quoting Ferrone, 113 A. at457). The jury should 
initially receive and deliberate only on the first part of the 
information, id. Then if the jury returns a verdict of "guilty" 
on the substantive offense, then they should be given the second 
part of the information and "should be charged to inquire on that 
issue." Id. 
In addition, the Utah Court quoted and adopted language from 
Ferrone which allows the defendant to plead guilty to the second 
part of the information so that further proceedings with the jury 
are not necessary, or the defendant could choose to submit the 
second issue of prior convictions to the court and not the jury, 
id. 
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Accordingly, the Stewart Court held that because "the prior 
convictions could not properly be considered by the jury in 
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the 
substantive offense," it was "reversible error to permit evidence 
thereof to be presented to the jury in the trial of that issue." 
Stewart, 171 P.2d at 386. Furthermore, Utah courts have 
repeatedly affirmed that "evidence of prior crimes is generally 
presumed prejudicial and that 'absent a reason for the admission 
of the evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the 
evidence is excluded.'" State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 
1989). 
In James, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its "inherent 
supervisory power over trial courts" and adopted a bifurcated 
procedure in the context of first degree murder under Utah Code 
Annotated Section 76-5-202(1) (h) which would preclude 
presentation of defendant's prior conviction until a finding of 
guilt on the current killing. James, 767 at 557. Accord, State 
v. F^ore?, 777 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 494-99 (Utah 1988) (separate opinion of Zimmerman, J.). See 
also, State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) (Trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to sever burglary and theft 
charges from possession of firearm charge for which evidence of a 
prior conviction was admissible). 
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Likewise, in this case the statute is devoid of any guidance 
from the legislature as to the procedures to be used in felony-
DUI proceedings. Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(7) (1993) 
simply states that a "fourth or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of the prior violations. . . 
is a third degree felony" that is subject to a greater penalty. 
Moreover, like the scenarios in Stewart and Ferronef "until a 
verdict has been rendered on the principal offense, there is no 
occasion to mention the prior convictions since previous offenses 
would not be competent to prove that defendant committed the 
offense for which he is then on trial." Stewart, 171 P.2d at 
387. In other words, evidence of Smith's prior-DUI convictions 
is incompetent to prove that, on the occasion resulting in the 
current offense, Smith was driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Accordingly, prejudice to Smith which resulted from the 
jury's knowledge of the prior convictions should be presumed; and 
this Court should conclude that the trial court, in refusing to 
bifurcate the proceedings as requested by the parties, abused its 
discretion. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the trial courtfs failure to bifurcate the 
proceedings as required by established precedent, Smith asks this 
Court to reverse his conviction on grounds that he was prejudiced 
by the jury's knowledge of his previous DUI convictions prior to 
deliberation on the current, substantive offense. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ 1 day of January, 1997. 
Margareyt P. Lindsay
 f, 
Counsel for Smith J 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary in this brief pursuant to Rule 
24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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